A framework for describing knowledge representations is developed using cognitive and learning theories. It is proposed that different knowledge representations serve to prime recipients with different schemas and thereby differentially affect their decision making. Interpretive, General, and Particular knowledge representations were evaluated in a laboratory experiment with managers. The study's hypotheses received mixed support with significant results indicating the importance of Particular knowledge representations in managerial decision making and an intriguing role for Interpretive knowledge representations. The study opens several new avenues for research on knowledge transfer.
Learning Theory, Knowledge Representations, and Knowledge Transfer
It is a widespread perception that knowledge created by scholars is not used in practice. This perception exists in the social sciences and humanities (Easton, 1991) , psychology (Fowler, 1990; Hoshmand and Polkinghorne, 1992; McGuire, 1983; Peterson, 1991) and education (Hallinan, 1996; Johnson, Malone & Hightower, 1997) , as well as the management disciplines (Beyer, 1982; Cheit, 1991; Hambrick, 1994; Myers, Massey, & Greyser, 1980; Porter & McKibbon, 1988) . Management researchers have proposed to reduce this perceived gap by arguing for their preferred approaches to knowledge creation and transfer. Many of them call for creating management knowledge by identifying unambiguous, basic principles and demonstrating how they transcend specific contexts. Thompson (1956) advocated this approach over forty years ago, and more recently Hitt (1998) emphasized the development of theoretical knowledge as the primary objective of the discipline.
Other management researchers respond to the perceived gap between knowledge and practice by generating applied knowledge. Thomas and Tymon (1982) , for example, propose that the "knowledge producer" should enhance its relevance by obtaining information about specific problems and situations encountered by "knowledge users." Likewise, Piore (1983) advocates unstructured early stage observations and interviews with system participants to learn the unique ways in which they understand their own system. Srivastava (1987) makes parallel recommendations for researchers in strategic management-that is, adopt variables that easily relate to organizational goals, test research results in specific organizational settings, use rigorous qualitative methodologies to incorporate practical insights, and document contextual conditions within which research becomes useful.
Reviewing the results of 27 empirical studies about the utilization of social science research, Beyer and Trice (1982) describe a complex process of knowledge utilization which depends on many contextual factors, such as how organizations process information, how affect between clients and researchers is established, how strategy is formulated and controlled, and how action is generated.
Other management scholars have also recognized the importance of users' contexts and processes, hypothesizing that knowledge utilization is influenced by such factors as task complexity and communication flows (Menon & Varadarajan, 1992) , or cognitive team processes (Madhavan & Grover, 1998) .
In this paper we take a step back from these diverse claims about specific forms, contexts or processes by which knowledge from scholarly research should be made available to management.
Instead, we draw upon theories of cognition and learning to suggest a framework for classifying forms of knowledge representation and to propose that the form of representation infuences its processing and subsequent utilization. In our framework, knowledge representations vary on two dimensions: the literal to the figurative, and the abstract to the concrete. Using these dimensions, we hypothesize the potential role of particular, general, and interpretive forms of representation in managerial decision making, and report on an initial empirical study of their influence on decision outcomes.
By focusing on forms of knowledge representation and their differential effects, we are tying our work to two foundations in cognitive research. First, we recognize the importance of schemas in human cognition (Rumelhart, 1984) . The core idea of schema, which can be traced back to Kant and was initially proposed in psychology by Bartlett (1932) , is that of "generic knowledge structures that guide the comprehender's interpretations, inferences, expectations and attention" (Graesser and Nakamura, 1982, p. 60) . We propose that different forms of knowledge representation induce different schemas through a process of priming (Hansen, 1995) and thereby influence subsequent decision making. Second, our work responds to Walsh's (1995) call for research on the effects of the content of managerial knowledge structures. The present research contributes to the field of knowledge transfer by moving beyond descriptive studies to evaluate the impact of knowledge structures on managerial decision making. Like Rosch (1975) we utilize priming to explore the what, not the how question of knowledge transfer. The focal question is whether different forms of knowledge representation affect decision outcomes, not the underlying processes that might "explain" this effect. We rely on the notion of schema, but here are not concerned with the mechanism by which it operates, be it activation, spread of energy, tagging, or evaluation of paths (Rosch, 1975, p. 194) . In so doing, our research responds to the call for empirical research on the transfer of knowledge between academics and practitioners by providing initial insights into questions such as, do different ways of representing knowledge matter in managerial decision making? and does this effect vary for different types of decisional outcomes? We hope that our initial insights would provide an impetus for the study of the knowledge transfer processes by academics and practitioners alike.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
We propose a framework, displayed in Figure 1 , that employs the distinctions between "abstract" and "concrete" cognitive functions, and between "figurative" and "literal" language systems.
Based on these two distinctions, we propose three forms of knowledge representations as noted in Figure 1 . Below we discuss each of the two distinctions in turn, draw hypotheses for empirical examination and thereafter test the influence of the three knowledge representations on decision making outcomes with experienced managers. We recognize that a managerial decision has several different dimensions including the depth and breadth of ideas and analysis utilized, and the perceived decision satisfaction. Although it is likely that the effect of knowledge representations varies for different decision outcomes, little if any conceptual or empirical research exists to posit specific hypotheses for each decision outcome. For this reason, we propose nonspecific hypotheses for knowledge representation effect but include multiple decisional dimensions in our empirical study in order to explore differential effects if any.
[Figure 1 about here]

Abstract and Concrete Cognitive Structures
The long-standing distinction between abstract and concrete cognitive functioning has been renewed and extended by recent developments in the cognitive sciences. Rosch and colleagues have demonstrated that categories of concepts vary in their level of abstraction or inclusiveness, and that the basic level category is particularly informative (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976) . In a hierarchy of categories, the basic level is defined as a level of specificity for which members of a culture associate a large number of relevant attributes. The category "furniture", for instance, does not have nearly as many attributes associated with it as the category "sofa". Further detailed categorization, such as "curved sofa" will not yield significantly more attributes, so in this example, "sofa" would be a basic level category. Rosch (1975) argues that basic level categories are highly informative because that is the level at which patterns of similarity and discontinuity are most salient and are the highest level of abstraction at which a distinct mental image can be formed. Tversky and Hemenway (1984) have argued that the attributes of basic level categories are particularly salient because they often serve both as a part of the basic level category (sofa includes cushion and legs) and also as a functional element of the basic level category (cushion and leg are associated with functions of sitting and supporting). They propose that it is the dual nature of parts at the basic level category that helps make it an especially informative level for organizing our understanding of the world.
Levels of abstraction in categorization are in turn related to levels of abstraction in conceptual thinking. Murphy and Lassaline (1997) , for example, expand on the notion of a basic level category and discuss a universal hierarchy of naturally occurring concepts found in languages across many cultures. Murphy and Lassaline argue that the basic or intermediate level of classification is the most natural and preferred level of conceptual thinking, since it balances the breadth of superordinate level classification with the predictive ability of the subordinate categories. In a series of experiments, Whittlesea (1997) demonstrates that we skillfully draw upon this memory level of particulars to abstract general knowledge on demand. In this manner, particularity of the basic level is preserved in memory and more general knowledge is abstracted when needed, as in understanding whether an event is idiosyncratic or not.
Although Murphy and Lassaline defer with regard to non-object domains, such as actions and emotions, Vallacher and Wegner (1987) have found that the abstract-concrete distinction is also relevant to how people think about their actions. Following William James, their "action-identity" theory describes how individuals consciously understand, conceptualize, and communicate about their actions with mental representations that constitute a hierarchical identity structure. Thus, a single action can be represented and articulated abstractly (I am visiting a friend), at a lower level (I am ringing the doorbell), or quite concretely (I am lifting my finger). Vallacher and Wegner (1987) derive three theoretical principles from this line of research: 1) action is maintained with respect to its prepotent identity (what we have in mind to do serves as a frame of reference for conducting action), 2) there is a tendency for the higher level identity to become prepotent when both a higher and a lower level of act identity are available, and 3) a lower level identity becomes prepotent when an action cannot be maintained at a higher level of identity (e.g., due to difficulties in the environment). This suggests that we operate at multiple levels of abstraction not just in regard to conceptual categories but also in regard to understanding our own actions. It further suggests that higher order levels of abstraction are prepotent, shaping our understanding as it unfolds. Barsalou (1983 Barsalou ( , 1985 demonstrates that actors construct categories ad hoc, and are not constrained to the "natural" basic categories discussed by Rosch and others. These ad hoc categories, in turn, have graded structures of what constitutes a better or worse example of the category that are shaped by the actor's ideals and goals. This suggests a personal and action based process of category development.
Bringing these themes back to the level of personal development, Karmiloff-Smith (1984; 1988) , Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder (1974/75) , Clark and Karmiloff-Smith (1993) , and present a plausible theory about the development of abstract cognitive structures and their role in a process of personal theorizing that is essential to our competence as humans. KarmiloffSmith's experiments reveal that children hold an internally represented theory, a theory-in-action, that constrains overt behavior. Similar to a Kuhnian process of coherence and change in scientific thought, children's interactions with the physical world can be described as hypothesis testing, attributing negative feedback to procedural error, rejecting anomalous data, and even inventing confirmatory data.
Children eventually revise their theories to make more unified and coherent sense of disparate experience, just as scientific thought often shifts to a more encompassing paradigm. Kolb's (1984) theory of experiential learning shows how this theory building and theory testing developmental process continues throughout adult life.
Thus, we view the process of cognitive development as consisting of endogenously redescribing knowledge structures or schemas from a basic level into a more abstract and encompassing form. This hierarchical development allows a person to interact more successfully with the extant world. Whether this development results from innate predisposition or through the intermediation of external symbolic systems such as language (Dennet, 1993; Bechtel, 1993) or external demands (Whittlesea, 1997) , representational redescription constitutes personal theorizing.
Several observations from these areas of research are important for the present study. First, various branches of cognitive psychology utilize an abstract-concrete distinction to understand cognitive structures and processes. Human interaction with the world relies upon the ability to move between abstract and concrete mental structures. Second, humans are theoreticians, not simply pragmatists.
Systematic abstractions, or theory, play a vital and inevitable role in managerial action. Third, human performance is a function of the breadth and generality of an actor's espoused theories. Performance of more complex tasks relies on a hierarchy of abstract constructs, not isolated, or unconnected actions.
The cognitive theories reviewed above suggest that knowledge representations based on abstract concepts should offer more flexible and encompassing ways of understanding problems.
Karmiloff-Smith's claim that individuals create theories upon which they rely for guidance, and Vallacher & Wegner's (1987) proposition that the higher level identity becomes prepotent, point to the primacy of general, abstract knowledge over concrete, particular knowledge. Knowledge representations based on abstract concepts are expected to prime abstract schemas and the processes of abstracting from basic level categories (Whittlesea, 1997) . Accordingly, when managers encounter knowledge objects, such as textual discussions of management issues, we posit that:
H1:
The outcomes of managerial decision-making on complex tasks will be higher after exposure to abstract knowledge relative to concrete and contextualized knowledge.
Knowledge as a Function of Figurative Rather Than Literal Learning
The literature reviewed above assumes that knowledge representations, whether abstract or concrete, are literal; that is, words are used in their usual way and the intended meaning is the primary, customary one. In contrast, Bruner's (1996 Bruner's ( , 1990 psycho-cultural approach to education and Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) work on the importance of metaphor and embodiment in the functioning of language suggests the importance of the figurative in knowledge representation. Boje (1991) for instance, identifies story telling as a preferred mode for managers' sense making activity (Weick, 1995) .
In such figurative knowledge, intended meanings are ambiguous and the knowledge content is left to the reader's interpretation. In a narrative or allegorical process, mind operates with evocative representations of "reality," in which members of a community define technical and social life through culturally specific practices of language use. Individuals learn the practices of a community by participating in its language games and forms of life (Wittgenstein, 1953) . They learn those practices by moving through a progression of experiences from peripheral participants to full community members (Lave and Wenger, 1991) . Evocative and narrative representations permit the assignment of different meaning to the same thing on different occasions, and allow those in the community to "know" what is appropriate and what is not in that culture. Culture both shapes the human mind and is shaped by it through narrative language.
According to Bruner (1990) , "reality" is imputed and constructed through the way we narrativize our ongoing experiences. Meaning is a function of cultural tradition and culturally specific ways of thinking that are learned through the stories we tell that construct "the way things should be."
He suggests that education should focus on helping people become skilled in constructing meaning through narratives of internal dialogue and social interaction. Shank (1995) goes as far as to attribute all memory and intelligence to our narrative capacity as humans. The meaning of any fact or information depends on the narrative frame of reference or perspective from which it is seen, and the rules of evidence within that perspective. Lakoff (1987) , drawing on Putnam (1981) , argues that a strong form objectivist or realist view of knowledge requires a unique perspective in which the individual can step out of themselves and achieve an externalist, God's eye view of the world. Recognizing the difficulties in adopting such a view, Lakoff concurs with Johnson (1987) in emphasizing the inherently embodied nature of our image schemas. Our experience as embodied beings structures our perspectives and limits our capacity for achieving a view from outside our situation. We use the experience of our body as a container and of our body moving through space as a source of root metaphors in everyday cognition. Individuals' bring multiple perspectives to the ambiguous and incomplete stimuli in their environments from which they construct personal narratives or stories that define themselves in the world. On a cultural level, these narratives provide models of identity and agency to members. Learning about ourselves and the world occurs through a process of self-narrativizing which is inherently interpretive (Boland and Tenkasi 1995) . Our self narrativizations bring coherence to the "blooming, buzzing confusion" of our ongoing stream of experiences, and serve as an evolving theory of our world and our place in it. This view is consistent with Freire's (1970) problem-posing approach to learning in which learners open themselves to an exploration of possible meanings in interpreting a text. It is also coheres with Berthoff's (1981) theory of composition in which thinking, composing, and acting are simultaneous processes for structuring experience wherein ambiguities play a vital role.
Accordingly we argue that learning and narrativizing may be facilitated by figurative rather than literal knowledge products. Ambiguous and implicit forms of knowledge can encourage active learner participation in the interpretative process and enhance learning through greater engagement. Even though figurative knowledge products may result in inaccurate learning, this risk is more than compensated by greater interest, motivation, and attention on the part of the learner. A traditional view of "knowledge as object" on the other hand, assumes that knowledge is objective, universal, and complete (Tenkasi & Mohrman, 1995) . In this "banking" view, knowledge products are like bricks and learning is a process for constructing knowledge by stacking the bricks in particular ways in the mind of the learner (Freire, 1970) . Others label the traditional view a "conduit metaphor" in which one assume that knowledge communication can be error free as if it were transferred through a conduit (Reddy, 1979) . Knowledge products in this approach may be either concrete or abstract as noted above, but most importantly they minimize ambiguity and subjectivity-they express a readily apparent message.
Empirical support for the power of ambiguous over manifest knowledge objects comes from an evaluation study of an innovative experiment in accounting, called "Project Discovery" (Stone & Shelley, 1997) . One group of undergraduate accounting students was exposed to traditional accounting education stressing objectified (declarative) knowledge. Another group of students participated in an instructional program based on ideas of cognitive development consistent with those of Bruner. The latter focused on complex, ill-structured, ambiguous problems and cases and on using active learning approaches to developing intellectual skills as well as a positive social environment for learning and innovation. Within the design limitation of the study, the authors concluded that "Project Discovery graduates were no worse than traditional program graduates in their traditional accounting declarative knowledge, and that they had better problem-solving skills and attitudes toward accounting instruction compared with traditional program graduates" (Stone & Shelley, 1997: 36 H2:
The outcomes of managerial decision-making on complex tasks will be higher after exposure to figurative knowledge objects relative to literal knowledge objects.
Applying Knowledge Representations to Tasks
We rely on the notion of schema as the mechanism by which the experience of a particular kind of knowledge representation affects performance on a subsequent managerial task. A schema can be seen as a theory about the representation of knowledge and how that representation facilitates the use of the knowledge (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977) , and may be understood to be a knowledge structure (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984) or an interpretive process (D'Andrade, 1992) . Much psychological research shows that individuals have available a repertoire of schemata upon which they can draw to interpret events (Rumelhart, 1984) . A change in schema is a change of perspective and affects our attention and recall (Anderson & Pritchert, 1978) . Reading a piece of literature can place people in a particular perspective and selectively activate schemas. When individuals read a story, they have the ability to abstract a lesson from the story and apply that schema to a disparate situation (Gick & Holyoak, 1983) .
The impact of a schema is far reaching. "Schemas have been shown to affect memory through attention processes, through acting as a framework to preserve episodic information, through integration of old and new knowledge, through a retrieval process and through an output editing process." (Brewer and Nakamura, 1984, p. 152) . In a given setting, at a given time, a schema may be activated into working memory, with other schema receding into the background (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981) .
Activation can occur through individuals being exposed to a particular set of stimuli, a process that produces cognitive priming (c.f., Berkowitz & Rogers, 1986) . Most interestingly, priming can activate a schema that influences subsequent performance even without the person being directed to apply the prior learning, a process labeled "implicit memory" (Roediger & McDermott, 1993) . For example, an initial reading that is out of the context of a subsequent reading can produce a memory effect. Implicit memory can involve either categorizing or conceptual tasks; it occurs in immediate temporal sequencing and when the time between priming and performance is on the order of days (c.f., Rappold & Hashtroudi, 1991) . Priming for implicit memory effects is heightened when individuals engage in generating and elaborating materials rather than simply reading them (Roediger & McDermott, 1993) . Through a temporal linking, then, priming of schema can influence attention and subsequent schema activation (Anderson, 1996; McClelland and Rumelhart, 1985) . For instance, a recent study reports that music education helps some people organize the way that they think and work in mathematics and spatial reasoning (Black, 1997) , and a substantial set of studies has established that watching particular types of popular music videos can affect later social judgments (Hansen, 1995) .
Research on reading has found that particular characteristics of texts, such as genre (story vs. expository passage vs. poem) and use of personification, influence grade school students' mental imagery and interest (Long, Winograd & Bridge 1989) , when topic is held constant. Similarly, in two different readings on one topic, such characteristics as authors' provision of unexpected information and use of comparisons and analogies differentially stimulated undergraduate students' interest (Wade, Buxton & Kelly, 1999) . Following these lines, we can anticipate that priming, in the form of working with a particular knowledge representation, can activate a schema that influences the subsequent interpretation of a managerial decision task.
Priming provides us with a means to investigate empirically the effects of various types of knowledge representations on managerial decision-making (see Figure 2 ). Different groups of managers can be primed by reading differing knowledge representations and their performance on a subsequent decision making task can be evaluated. As depicted in Figure 2 , the cognitive and learning theories reviewed above lead to an expectation that Interpretive (I) knowledge representations will be associated with high performance outcomes and Particular (P) knowledge representations with lower outcomes. Further, in accord with H1, exposure to General (G) knowledge representations is hypothesized to result in higher decisional outcomes relative to Particular (P) knowledge. Hypothesis two proposes that Interpretive (I) knowledge yields higher decisional outcomes than either G-or P-type representations. Taken together, H1 and H2 are reflected in the hypothesized line in Figure 2 .
−−−−−− Insert Figure 2 about here −−−−−−
RESEARCH METHODS AND DESIGN
Sample Selection and Experimental Assignment
We utilized a randomized allocation procedure for our three group, two phase (i.e., "before"
and "after") experimental design. A "before" and "after" design was thought to be appropriate because it allows control over individual factors including learning styles, educational background and ability. As such, we were more interested in individual change because of exposure to treatment (i.e., different knowledge representations). We sought the cooperation of participants enrolled in graduate-level management degree programs (e.g., MBA) for executives at a major private University by asking them to complete consent forms. The enrollees in this part-time program are active managers who either have an MBA degree or are working towards one (see Table 1 ). Of the 82 potential participants, 53
agreed to participate resulting in a 65% consent rate. In the "before" phase, each participant was asked to read the decision task, provide a managerial decision and respond to specific questions (see decision task and measures below). In order to reduce interviewer bias, all materials and responses were collected utilizing a computer program specially designed for this study. The questions were presented interactively to the participants and their responses collected by clicking the appropriate box on the computer screen. Participants were informed about a follow up study but not about its nature, in order to reduce interactive testing effects. In addition, in order to reduce pre-measurement and testing effects, responses were collected anonymously. Each participant selected their own 8-digit code that was used to match the "before" and "after" responses but preserved their identity. Table 1 This open-ended instruction was intended to engage the subject in processing the treatment material with the activated schema, thereby reinforcing the priming effect of the treatment's knowledge representation. Following exposure to their respective treatments, participants were asked to complete a decision task. The participants were told that some of them might receive the same task as earlier, although all of them in actuality received the identical decision task. We reasoned that this "explanation" combined with anonymity would likely depress demand artifact tendencies that come from participants' desire to appear consistent when their identity is transparent. Finally, the participants were asked to approach the decision task from a fresh perspective but without explicitly requiring that they use the specific knowledge representations that they had read.
−−−−−− Insert
Although the content of the treatments did not relate directly to the decision task case scenario, we expected that the different knowledge representations would cognitively prime the participants differently. This priming was thought to have spill-over effects as the participants tackled a somewhat independent decision task. In this sense, our experiment provides a conservative test of the underlying hypotheses.
Of the 53 participants who provided complete data for the "before" part of the experiment, 40
completed the "after" phase providing a 75% completion rate. However, only 34 responses were usable and complete providing a 65% usable rate. A profile of the "usable" participants is provided in Table 1 . Sample attrition of this magnitude is common in longitudinal research. The small sample size requires that we balance Type I and Type II error rates in statistical testing. At a traditional 95%
confidence level, the power is only 0.20 (Cohen, 1977) , given an average cell size of 12. Stevens (1996, pp. 172++) recommends a more "lenient" alpha level as a way to improve power. We chose an 80% confidence level to ensure at least a power of 0.50. Thus, we set the Type I error rate at 20%.
Treatment Materials
Because the distinct forms of knowledge representations tested here have not been empirically utilized in the management literature to date, all treatment materials were developed specifically for this study. We designed the treatments to involve relatively short (e.g., half page or less) texts that describe a managerially relevant situation and the reaction of involved actors that is either literally or figuratively guided by one or more theoretical principles (i.e., the knowledge content). Selection of treatment themes was guided by the authors' knowledge of (a) a figurative statement relevant to a managerial issue and (b) a corresponding theoretical statement within the managerial or social sciences and (c) an actual or plausible concrete case illustration in a business setting. Several desiderata guided our development and testing of treatment materials including (a) theoretical consistency, (b) readability, (c) balance across representations, and (d) external validity. By theoretical consistency, we imply that the knowledge content in the texts is presented in accord with the conceptualizations of I, G and P knowledge
representations. As such, interpretive or I-type narratives were expected to present the knowledge more figuratively relative to G-and P-type representations. By readability we imply that the texts were easily read and understood. In order to maintain participant interest and work within the confines of a pragmatic experimental design lasting no longer than 45-60 minutes, we limited the texts to no more than 300 words (about ½ page). By balance we imply that the texts are structurally invariant across the three treatment groups. That is, we wanted the treatments to differ only because of knowledge
representations. As such, we sought to ensure that the treatments were similar in terms of the number of words and/or perceived complexity. In addition, a common theme was utilized for all treatments. By external validity we imply that the treatment themes and content should be commonly found in the academic and professional management literature. Therefore, in developing our treatments, we drew from published materials. Below, we discuss the logic of treatments and an indication of the sources used in developing them.
In all, we developed six treatments, two for each form of knowledge representation. The use of multiple treatments was based on Gick and Holyoak's (1983) finding that multiple analogies stimulate schema activation, and on Cross (1999) who draws upon a study by Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth (1979) to suggest that schemas can be strengthened by "repeated activation." Exposure to two forms of each treatment involving a given knowledge representation was thought to strengthen activation and differential priming across treatments. We reasoned that this was particularly useful because of our conservative experimental design with little direct overlap between treatment content and subsequent decision task case scenario. Each set of {I, G, and P} treatments had a basic theme. One was the relationship of technology to human and social endeavors and the other was group cohesion and the effect of discovering the inauthenticity of a central member (see Appendix A). The description and rationale for each treatment is as follows.
Theme 1: Interrelationships of Technology and Human Behavior
A: Interpretive Knowledge Representation: Technology and the Self This parable was published in the book by Dirk Hanson, entitled The New Alchemists (1982). The case is used by the author as a counter-point to his argument, indicating that most of "us," unlike the gardener near the Han river basin, want to take advantage of the benefits of technology.
B: General-type Knowledge Representation: Technology and Social Change
This material is adapted from ideas discussed in the chapter, "The Shape of Truth to Come: New Media and Knowledge," by Chris Carlsson, in James Brook and Iain A. Boal (eds.), Resisting the Virtual Life: The Culture and Politics of Information (1995).
C: Particular-type Knowledge Representation: Technology and Work
This treatment particularizes the finding from Jeffrey Arthur's (1994) study, "Effects of human resource systems on manufacturing performance and turnover," Academy of Management Journal that high commitment managerial approaches are associated with higher productivity. In keeping with the ideas in David Whetten & Kim Cameron, Developing Management Skills (1998) This story is somewhat of a legend among persons participating in the virtual world, and it has a number of variations. The specific material used for this study was adapted from The War of Desire and Technology at the Close of the Mechanical Age, by Allucquere Rosanne Stone (1995) . The case is also discussed at length and put into a psychological context in Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet (1995) by Sherry Turkle.
B: General-type Knowledge Representation: Member Relationships and Group Cohesion
This statement is based on a quotation from the book: Anselm Strauss, G. H. Mead on Social Psychology (1986). The quote was presented in Stone's theoretical discussion of issues about identity and the self in War of Desire and Technology (1995: 87) . This discussion closely follows upon and was intended to establish a theoretical context for the story presented as "Reactions to Misrepresentation on the Net" also drawn from Stone's book.
C: Particular-type Knowledge Representation: Leadership and Corporate Morale
This story seeks to particularize the general issues presented in I and G forms of knowledge representation pertaining to this set of materials. In specific terms, the story was written based upon a case study, "Crisis in Conscience at Quasar," by John Fendrock (1968a) , in the Harvard Business Review. The case was widely disseminated and was the focus for a reader survey with over 3,600 responses about the ethical issues involved which was published also in the Harvard Business Review as "Sequel to Quasar Stellar," also by John Fendrock (1968b) .
Manipulation Checks
Several procedures were utilized to test the treatments. First, the treatments were examined for face validity. The I-treatments were selected and refined to ensure that knowledge was represented figuratively containing both abstract and concrete ideas (e.g., the story of Tzu-gung, see Appendix A).
By contrast, the P treatments presented highly contextualized ideas in a literal manner with relatively higher levels of concreteness (e.g., Bill Lavery's situation, see Appendix A). The G-treatments were developed to emphasize abstract knowledge that is relatively less contextualized but presents the ideas literally (e.g., see "Technology and Social Change" in Appendix A). Second, we asked 5 judges to evaluate the three treatments along the figurative-literal dimension. Each judge was asked to rate each treatment on three response scales. For instance, one of the response scales asked if the knowledge content of the treatment is "expressly identified for all readers" or "left to the interpretation of the reader" on a 7-point rating scale. The mean judgments for the I, G and P were 4.4, 4.4 and 5.0 (higher numbers indicate more "literal" knowledge). This suggests that, while the P treatments are clearly more literal, it is hard for judges to discriminate between I and G treatments. This occurs in part because, as abstract knowledge, G treatments tend to be perceived as implicit and relatively less literal material.
However, as is evident from Appendix A, the I-treatment are presentationally different from the G treatments. Third, in order to supplement these judgments, we obtained self report measures from participants on "abstract" (2 item scale, high numbers indicate more abstract knowledge) and "concrete" (2 item scale, high numbers indicate more concrete knowledge) dimensions. The mean values obtained for the I, G and P treatments were 3.90, 4.90 and 4.0 on the abstract dimension, and 4.0, 3.6 and 4.42 on the concrete dimension. This suggests that the G treatments are perceived as significantly more abstract than either the I or P treatments (F = 3.28, p < .05) and the P treatments are perceived as significantly more concrete than the G treatments (F = 2.34, p < .10). However, P and I treatments are not significantly different along the concrete dimension. We recognize that these treatments can be further refined to increase the contrast among knowledge representations. For our initial study, the current treatments appear reasonable as greater contrast among the treatments will only serve to make our experiment conservative. Thus, if meaningful results are obtained in our initial study, it should be highly encouraging for future research.
Decision Task Case Scenario
The decision task involved a case study followed by several questions designed to capture the participant's decision making rationale and collect our dependent variables. In choosing the case scenario, we were guided by three criteria: (a) specificity, that is, a particular problem must be presented that requires managerial decision making, (b) ecological validity, that is, the case study must be perceived as realistic and valid, and (c) empirically viable, that is, the case scenario must allow for variability in decision making across participants to facilitate empirical testing of its determinants. After a careful review of the literature, we chose the case scenario developed recently by Sparks and Hunt (1998) . This case involves a specific problematic situation for an analyst named Bob Smith, an employee of L&H Marketing Research Company. Bob is required to complete a report for an important client interested in introducing a new line of products (see Appendix B). The case raises several issues that are typical of contemporary client-supplier relationships including financial (e.g., budgeting), technical (e.g., research design and sampling), relational (e.g., dealing with vendors, maintaining long term relationships), and implementation (e.g., executing projects, dealing with uncertainties) issues. Moreover, Sparks and Hunt (1998) embedded three ethical issues within their case scenario that involved research integrity, fair treatment of vendors and research confidentiality. As such, the chosen case requires participants to develop a managerial decision involving multiple, conflicting factors. Sparks and Hunt (1998) provide considerable evidence regarding the ecological validity of the case scenario. In particular, these authors report evidence from (a) four pretests with different samples (e.g., students, faculty and practitioners), (b) a pilot test with 125 marketing research practitioner members of the American Marketing Association, (c) a follow-up (but independent) sample of 188 marketing research practitioners, and (d) two separate samples of marketing students (N = 142 and 178). Because the case was revised and refined based on inputs especially during the pretest and pilot stages, the final version of the case holds a high degree of relevance and validity for the target population. Finally, the empirical results reported by Sparks and Hunt (1998) indicate that the case is empirically viable as it captures variability across participants. Although our focus is more comprehensive than Sparks and Hunt's intention to capture ethical sensitivity of managers (see measures below), their data is indicative of the empirical viability of the case. Using a weighted measure of ethical sensitivity (see measures below), Sparks and Hunt report mean values of 2.7 and 7.7 for students and practitioners, with standard deviations of 3.4 and 5.8 respectively. This suggests that the case scenario is sensitive to variability in the respective samples.
Measures
Both quantitative and qualitative measures were collected as a part of the experiment. Each quantitative measure involved multiple self-report items. Qualitative data were collected using openended questions and analyzed by multiple coders. We describe the measures below. The analytical strategy for both qualitative and quantitative data is discussed at a later point in the methods section.
In all, three open-ended questions were utilized to obtain the managerial decision arrived at by each participant. First, the participants were asked to identify the critical issues in the decision situation and to rate their importance on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 as "somewhat important" to 10 as "extremely important." Participants could list as many issues as they wanted, although 10 lines were specifically provided in the computer program. Second, each participant was asked to develop a decision recommendation for Bob Smith. The specific directions used were as follows: "Now, imagine you are the "outsider" that Bob turns to for guidance in dealing with his dilemmas. Indicate all of the factors that you feel Bob should consider and how would you advise him in this situation. Be sure to explain your reasoning or rationale for your advice as fully as possible."
Third, we sought to obtain a decision recommendation for the company involved in the case by asking the participants to:
"Also, continuing your role as an outsider, please tell us any additional lessons the L&H Company could learn from this case to avoid similar situations in the future. What specific actions should the L&H Company take today because of these lessons and why?"
We reasoned that the open-ended format and asking participants to develop decision recommendations for both the individual involved and the company would provide rich data for assessing the different aspects of decision outcomes. In the absence of an agreed-upon standard for judging a "correct" answer to the decision task, as in exercises such as Desert Survival (Lafferty and Pond, 1987) or Lost at Sea (Nemiroff and Pasmore, 1975), we evaluated decision outcomes on multiple dimensions. We reasoned that it is useful to (a) focus on multiple dimensions of decision outcomes, (b) examine the influence of treatments on these multiple decision outcomes, and (c) interpret the differential effects in light of the treatments. Several procedures were followed to obtain these multiple dimensions that are described more fully in the "analysis strategy" section (to be discussed).
Here we merely outline our approach. First, we utilized a method of coding and categorizing the openended data to identify the idea units for each participant. These idea units were clustered into four major categories that emerged in the coding process. Then, we evaluated decision outcomes by analyzing the idea units for appropriateness, breadth, and depth. A judgment of appropriateness was made by screening idea units against a list of decision elements that would constitute a meaningful answer to the case. Breadth was evaluated based on the number of major categories included in a subject's task response. Depth was measured as a subject's maximal number of appropriate idea units in a major category. We adopted these measures of breadth and depth from Boland, Greenberg, Park and Han's (1990) technique for mapping responses in an ill-structured decision task.
Following the open-ended responses, several self-report measures for decision outcomes were also obtained to supplement our analysis. These measures included: (1) decision satisfaction, (2) decision diversity, (3) decision richness, and (4) decision task realism. The decision satisfaction measure asked the participants to rate their feelings with the decision recommendation on three 7-point semantic differential scales with end points as "very satisfied-not satisfied at all," "very confident-not confident at all," and "very pleased-not pleased at all." The Cronbach's alpha reliability of this measure was 0.88. The decision diversity measure was intended to capture the diversity of ideas represented in participants' decision recommendations. In all, three 7-point semantic differentials were utilized with endpoints as "many concepts-few concepts," "multiple perspectives-few focused perspectives," and "complex ideas-simple ideas." The Cronbach's alpha reliability for this measure was 0.77. The measure of decision richness required the participants to provide a self-evaluation of the decision recommendation they had developed using three 7-point semantic differential scales. The participants were asked to evaluate if, in developing their decision recommendations, they tended to worry about "interrelated issues" or "unrelated issues," consider "tradeoffs among different issues" or seek "best solution for each issue," and take into account "consequences of interacting issues" or "consequences of separate issues." We reasoned that, within the limitations of a self-report measure, a rich decision would be characterized by inter-related issues that required tradeoffs and consideration of the interactional consequences. The Cronbach's alpha reliability for this measure was 0.75. Finally, the decision task realism measure was utilized to assess if the decision task was perceived as realistic by participants. The measure involved three 7-point scales anchored by "realistic-contrived," "believable-unbelievable," and "plausible-implausible." The alpha reliability of this measure was 0.95.
Control Variables
Because decision making is subject to individual variability, we included several control variables to enhance the power of the experiment. Based on past research, we considered two personality variables-tolerance for ambiguity and need for cognition-and three demographic variables-education, age and experience. The need for cognition measure assesses the tendency for individuals to engage in and enjoy thinking and is drawn from a 34-item scale developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982) . We employed a short form of 16 items with an alpha reliability of 0.85. The tolerance of ambiguity measure is based on the work of Webster and Kruglanski (1994) and is defined as the "desire for a firm answer to a question and an aversion towards ambiguity." This measure involved 4 items obtained on a 5-point "strongly disagree-strongly agree" Likert scale with an alpha reliability of 0.69. Past research has shown that it is useful to control for personality and demographic variables in order to enhance the internal validity of experiments (Stone and Shelley 1997) .
Analysis Strategy
Different analytical procedures were followed for qualitative and quantitative data to conform to acceptable scientific standards (Smith et al. 1992; Pedhazur & Schemlkin 1991 ). The open-ended qualitative data from the "before" and "after" decision tasks were subjected to thematic analysis procedures by identifying and categorizing the idea units contained in the participants' written recommendations using a multistage, multicoder process.
First, one of the authors randomized the participants' responses assigning each a numeric code that could not be traced to the treatment condition or phase of the response. Second, two different authors jointly read 16 of the responses and made an initial inventory of the idea units they contained.
They worked phrase by phrase, sentence by sentence, to depict the essential ideas contained in each participant's response. Examples of idea units include: "Determine reasons for data inadequacies"; "Bob should consider leaving the company"; and "Set project management guidelines." Third, the two authors then worked separately to read and identify idea units in the remaining responses. Thereafter, the two authors met to reconcile their lists and to organize them in clusters of similar topics.
Fourth, the list of idea units and complexity factors were then used in a training session with two Ph.D. students who were experienced in thematic coding. In the presence of the two authors, the coders used the list to separately code and then jointly discuss 8 responses from participants that were not being used in the data analysis. Based on this training session and discussion with the coders, the list was further refined and organized by topic area. At this point, one of the authors developed a list of eight key issues embedded in the case which, if addressed by respondents, would contribute to an appropriate decision. Another author then reviewed the eight issues suggesting changes. Thereafter, both persons coded six responses to assure that respondent's idea units did map onto the eight "key" issues list, and based on further changes a final list was developed. This final list included required communication between Bob and his superiors on (1) expectations, (2) weaknesses in the study, (3) causes for incomplete surveys, and (4) the upcoming client meeting, as well as (5) company-wide issues of interpersonal manipulation, (6) inadequate planning and control of projects, and (7) unethical conduct. The final issue was (8) recognition of Bob's need to resolve tensions between company and personal values. The idea units were then screened using these eight key issues as a test for appropriateness. Three idea units could not be matched to one of these categories and were eliminated.
The final coding instrument contained 60 items in four major categories: Work Process, Professionalism in the Organization, Individual and Personal Concerns, and Potential Actions. The coding categories utilized and the corresponding idea units are depicted in Table 2 .
−−−−−− Insert Table 2 about here −−−−−−
Fifth, the coders were each then given a set of numerically ordered participants' responses, and asked to separately code them. Once they had coded all the participants' responses, we calculated their intercoder percent of agreement by dividing the total number of matched idea units, by the total idea units coded by both coders. This yielded percentage agreement rates of 75%, 72%, 82%, and 68% for the four major categories respectively. To resolve discrepancies, coders met to discuss each participant's response, compare their codings and discuss discrepancies until they came to agreement.
Their final consensus coding is the data we used for our qualitative analysis.
The quantitative data were analyzed by the method of analysis of covariance. The dependent variable was a difference score between the "before" and "after" measurements for each variable.
Using a "difference" score controls for individual variability and allows a more reasonable and conservative test of the treatment effect (Pedhazur & Schmelkin 1991) . Four dependent variables were considered separately including (1) ethical sensitivity, (2) decision diversity, (3) decision richness and (4) decision satisfaction (see "measures"). The ethical sensitivity variable was defined as per Sparks and Hunt (1998) and required developing a weighted composite score derived from the importance weights provided by the participant to one or more ethical issues in the case. Recall that there were three ethical issues embedded in the design. As noted under "measures," participants were asked to list the issues they considered important in the decision case scenario presented. The ethical sensitivity score is a product of the number of ethical issues listed by the participant (range = 0 to 3) and their corresponding importance weights (range = 1 to 10).
Both multivariate and univariate procedures with covariates were utilized to estimate the effect of treatments. Initially, we ran a MANOVA with all of the four dependent variables taken together, knowledge representation as the independent "treatment," and five covariates (age, education, experience, tolerance of ambiguity and need for cognition). A multivariate test provides control over experiment-wise Type I error rate. A significant MANOVA was followed by univariate tests with individual dependent variables retaining the covariates as control variables. To clearly display the treatment effects, we relied on graphical procedures supported by statistical significance data.
RESULTS
Below we report the results from the analysis of both the qualitative and quantitative data.
Recall that we are utilizing a confidence level of 80% for our test of statistical significance in order to balance the Type-I and Type-II error rates. Also, initially we factor analyzed all measures to ensure their convergent and discriminant validity. In most cases, measures loaded cleanly on their respective factors with significant loadings (> .30) and marginal cross-loadings (< .20). In a few cases (i.e., decision realism and tolerance for ambiguity measures), one or more offending items were identified.
Upon deletion, clean factor loadings were obtained. Together with reliability data (cf. "measures"), the study variables appeared reasonable for the purposes of examining the effect of knowledge representations. Table 2 's listing of participants' idea units (in the four major categories of "work process", "professionalism in the organization", "individual and personal concerns", and "potential actions") indicates that the decision task was rich in producing a wide range of responses. Before analyzing the frequency counts in each of the four major categories, we adjusted the counts to control for individual and group variability. Specifically, this adjustment required three steps: (1) normalize the "before" and "after" counts to account for different group sizes (I:G:P::14:10:10), (2) compute a Chi-square statistic for testing the null hypothesis of "no differences" across treatment groups by using the normalized "after" counts as the observed frequency and "before" counts as the expected frequency, and (3) compute difference scores between "before" and "after" counts for graphically displaying the treatment effect. In addition, we added a constant (value = 13) to all scores in order to obtain round positive numbers.
Test of Hypotheses: Qualitative Data
Readers will note that adding a constant does not influence the pattern of results, and computing the Chi-square statistic based on actual normalized counts ensures that the statistic is unaffected by adding constants. We applied the preceding procedures for the "breadth" and "depth" measures as well. category yielded significant differences with the P representations producing the highest number of idea units relating to action responses, followed by I and then G (overall χ 2 = 8.85, p < .05). Specifically, the a priori contrast for I versus G is significant indicating that I-treatment produced more "potential actions" than the G-treatment (χ 2 = 2.09, p < .20). Likewise, the a priori contrast for G versus P is significant as well (χ 2 = 8.75, p < .01); however, the effect is in the direction opposite to our hypothesis.
The P-treatment produced more "potential actions" than the G-treatment. In addition, a borderline effect is obtained for the "depth" measure. Based on a priori contrasts for I versus G, Figure 3 reveals that the I-treatment led to greater "depth" than the G-treatment, in accord with our hypothesis (χ 2 = 1.67, p < .25). While the differences for the other decision outcomes were not significant, some common patterns can be discerned. Specifically, the general pattern across all the major categories was for the number of idea units following I treatments to exceed or equal those following the G treatments.
With the sole exception of the "professionalism" responses, the P treatments similarly produced more idea units than did the G treatments.
H1, which posited higher outcomes for General over Particular knowledge representations, receives support only from the "professionalism" outcome measure. The hypothesis is contradicted by all other results. H2, positing higher outcomes for I than for G and P knowledge representations, receives mixed support. It is supported by the pattern for the "professionalism" responses, and with regard to the superiority of I over G in the other statistically significant cases. However, H2 is not supported for the comparison of Interpretive to Particular representations in all outcome measures except for "professionalism."
Test of Hypotheses: Quantitative Data
The MANOVA for the four self report measures produced a Wilks Λ of .30, F = 3.66, p < .01
indicating that the treatments yield a statistically significant effect. As such, we conducted individual ANCOVAs. Figure 4 summarizes the results obtained. The table at the bottom of Figure 4 reveals that two of the four decision variables-"ethical sensitivity" and "satisfaction"-showed significant differences across treatments (F = 7.67, and 4.54 respectively, p < .05). For the "decision satisfaction" variable, both a priori contrasts produced significant results so that the I-treatment produced higher scores than the G-treatment (χ 2 = 2.42, p < .20), and, in turn, the G-treatment yielded higher scores than the P-treatment (χ 2 = 2.41, p < .20). This accords with the hypothesized pattern of overall results in Figure 2 and supports both H1 and H2. The "ethical sensitivity" also produced significant results for a priori contrasts but the pattern of findings is somewhat different. In accord with H1, the "ethical sensitivity" scores for the I-treatment exceed that for the G-treatment (χ 2 = 14.57, p < .01). Likewise, the a priori contrast for G versus P is also significant (χ 2 = 6.53, p < .05); however, the results contradict H2 with the P-treatment producing higher scores than the G-treatment. Finally, the a priori contrast for I versus G for the "diversity" measure also produced a significant effect (χ 2 = 2.11, p < .20). The results contradict H1 as the I-treatment produced lower scores than the G-treatment, however. All three representations produced nearly equal "decision richness", yielding nonsignificant effects.
−−−−−− Insert Figure 4 about here −−−−−−
Alternative Explanations
While we have hypothesized that the effect of knowledge representations occurs due to differences in priming of schemas, an alternative explanation could be attributed to a writing mimicry effect. That is, participants simply mimicked the representational style of treatments in responding to the decision task. As such, the treatment materials may have been processed superficially making the priming effect unlikely. In order to test out this alternative hypothesis, we reasoned that the writing mimicry effect would likely be reflected in the writing style utilized by participants to write their decision task analysis. If the writing style varied systematically across the three treatments, this alternative hypothesis might have some merit.
1
To do so, we asked the two judges to evaluate each respondent's decision task report in the following manner. Initially, we mixed up the respondents' decision task reports providing them unique identifiers that were unrelated to their treatment assignment. The judges, who were blind to the treatments, were asked to review each decision task report and evaluate the "writing style" only, paying little attention to the content of ideas. The evaluation was obtained on a 5-point scale with a 4-item measure that assessed the "implicit," "abstract" and "concrete" dimensions of writing style. These measures correspond to the self-report measures used to assess the treatment tasks. The inter-rater reliability estimates before discussion between judges was .94, .88, and .90 for the "implicit", "abstract"
and "concrete" dimensions respectively. The judges then discussed and resolved discrepancies, and their consensus judgment were utilized for analysis. Consistent with our other analysis, the entire process was implemented for both the "before" and "after" data on decision task analysis. The two scores were subtracted and subjected to analysis of variance.
The ANOVA results indicate that none of the writing style dimensions vary significantly across the three treatment groups [F-values range from .11 to .92, p > .4]. This suggests that the mimicry hypothesis is not a tenable explanation for the pattern of results obtained and reported.
DISCUSSION
This study was designed as an initial experiment to study the influence of disparate knowledge representations on outcomes from an unrelated managerial decision making task. Although past research has consistently emphasized the significance of understanding this knowledge transfer process, little empirical research actually exists. We consider our study as an initial step towards filling this gap in the literature. As an initial study, several limitations of our work should be considered in evaluating its contribution. First, our results are based on a nonrandom sample of students enrolled in executive programs at a midwestern university. Although student samples have been considered appropriate where the focus is on internal validity, we recognize the tradeoffs involved and the threats to the generalizability of our findings. Our intention to focus mainly on the students enrolled in executive programs was likely useful in selecting a sample relevant to the purposes of this study. Second, and as a result of our focus on executive programs, our sample size is relatively small. The small sample size, however, is likely to reduce power and render our experimental results conservative at best. While we attempted to balance the error rates by a judicious choice of the confidence level, we recognize that we might have failed to detect other significant effects. Third, although we put significant effort into developing different knowledge representations that were consistent with our theoretical framework and were drawn from published sources, we recognize that more work is needed to further refine and develop such materials for future research. Developing conceptually and empirically valid treatments remains a challenging task not unlike that required in developing psychometrically sound scales. Fourth, we utilized a single decision task and it is unknown if the results obtained are affected by the idiosyncratic aspects of this task. Replication studies with other decision making tasks are necessary to overcome this limitation. Fifth, and finally, uncontrolled individual differences could have biased the results obtained. Although we used a random assignment procedure and included several control variables, it is possible that some individual differences occurred systematically across the three treatment groups. Because of experimental mortality, it is difficult to rule out this alternative explanation.
Despite these limitations, an interpretable and meaningful pattern of results was obtained. Two aspects of our results are especially noteworthy: (1) the priming, and (2) differential effect of knowledge representations. We discuss each in turn and close with conclusions and directions for future research.
Priming with Knowledge Representations
As an initial empirical study of the effects of knowledge representations on managerial decisionmaking outcomes, an important finding is that priming managers with differing representations has a differential effect on decisional outcomes. Despite a conservative design in which the content of the priming knowledge objects had little overlap with the content of the decision task, statistically significant differences were produced in a variety of outcome measures. There are two primary implications of these results. First, priming on more directly content-related material can be expected to produce at least as much, if not more, impact on managerial decisions as the implicit priming used here. Second, priming with differing knowledge representations involves something more than content transfer, something more than the "conduit" or "stacking bricks" metaphors anticipate. Instead, participants were apparently primed to activate different schemas by varying the forms of knowledge representations.
This study demonstrates that different forms of representations constructed to emphasize particular, general, or interpretive knowledge, can have differential impacts on managerial idea generation. As such, our findings highlight the relevance of activation theory to the topic of managerial knowledge dissemination and utilization. Consistent with the ideas of McClelland and Rumelhart (1981) , the results suggest that different schemas were activated by the disparate knowledge representations. Since there was no instruction to the managers to apply the treatment readings to the decision task, it appears that reading and elaborating on different knowledge treatments heightened the priming for implicit memory, much as was found in a different context by Roediger and McDermott (1993) ,. This suggests that the work of Bruner (1996 ), Friere (1970 ), and D'Andrade (1992 concerning the extraction of meaning from narratives is relevant to issues of managerial knowledge utilization.
Types of Knowledge Representations
This study's specific findings, which are more complex than indicated by the hypotheses, point to the need for more insightful theorizing and definitive measurement. Findings from this study concerning the superiority of one form of knowledge representation over another were mixed, and examining these preliminary results may provide guidance for theory and measurement. Such would be consistent with humans' ability to store particularized knowledge and abstract from it upon demand, as Whittlesea (1997) Taken together, we appear to have sufficient evidence to indicate that different knowledge representations hold the potential to differentially prime the schemas of managers and materially influence their creative thinking process in tackling managerial problems. Although in order to achieve internal validity we utilized relatively "pure" forms of knowledge representations, we recognize that different combinations of knowledge representations are plausible. For instance, a single article might simultaneously contain a theoretical model of a complex phenomenon (G-representation), employ analogies and metaphors to illuminate the conceptual ideas (I-representation), and specify managerial recommendations on the basis of empirical results (P-representation). Indeed, different materials may differ in terms of their knowledge configuration "mix"-that is, the relative amounts of I−, G− and P−representations embodied in the material. In this sense, our treatment materials are special instances of such configurations where a single type of representation dominates. However, based on our results, we can surmise that the influence of different configurations of knowledge representation on creative thinking processes and decision making would be nontrivial. In other words, the "mix" is likely to matter. Future researchers might find this search for the "right" mix an intriguing avenue to pursue and help guide the Academy's efforts to balance knowledge generation with effective transfer.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have drawn upon cognitive and educational psychology to support the notion that managers may be theorists as well as pragmatists, and that they are constructors of their own knowledge as well as users of knowledge created by others. Following these ideas led to the design of treatment materials reflecting Interpretive, General, and Particular knowledge representation and to an assessment of their impact on managerial decision making.
The methodological and theoretical issues of this research suggest that the current study has only begun to identify a number of interrelated questions in understanding knowledge utilization in management. A number of avenues for further research stand out from this study. Empirical pursuit of these and similar questions concerning the relation between knowledge representation and knowledge transfer seems essential if the academy is to seriously address the relationship between scholarship and practice.
In closing, we recognize that the knowledge developed in this study is represented as abstract and literal or the General form in the parlance of this paper. It is ironic, then, that we have adopted a representational form that our own results indicate to be least generative for managers. While our intended audience is other scholars rather than managers, this irony causes us to reflect upon the practices of knowledge generation and dissemination in the management community. In these reflections we are chastened against strongly-stated implications by our understanding that the findings reported here are provisional and suggestive, not definitive. The standards for General knowledge require that the present study be followed by extended research that refines theory, measures and designs.
However, we now ask ourselves whether that very process of refining and verifying General knowledge among management scholars limits the development and dissemination of Particular and Interpretive knowledge forms.
In this regard we observe that there is a lack of variety in the knowledge representation forms available in the scholarly literature. It may be, as our findings provisionally suggest, that the dominance of General knowledge representations is not adequately stimulating to managers. A more fundamental question is whether knowledge itself is being limited through current writing and publishing practices.
Might it not be that managers and academics alike would benefit from more varied outlets for knowledge representations? Two points are noteworthy. First, while some practitioner-oriented journals do offer more Particular representations for managers, there exists a largely unrealized opportunity for the writing and publishing of Interpretive, narrative, metaphorical, and allegorical knowledge. We recognize that reviewing and establishing the merit of such articles poses challenges and takes the field into uncharted territories. Second, where opportunities do exist for the publishing of alternative knowledge forms, the Academy has implicitly favored segregation of journals into "pure"
forms that are either dominated by General (e.g., the Academy of Management Journal) or Particular representations (e.g., the Academy of Management Executive). Such segregation promotes homogeneity of knowledge forms within a journal, and closes the door on alternative representations.
Just as the American society broke through the walls of segregation to embrace diversity, we ponder whether it would be similarly fruitful for some prestigious journals to encourage and seek varied forms of scholarship, mixing articles that represent knowledge in diverse ways and even presenting different knowledge representations within a single article. We speculate that, not unlike the society at large, this diversity might be more generative for the future management researcher and professional alike.
Appendix A1 Treatments Utilized for Testing the Effect of Knowledge Representations on Decision Outcomes: "Theme I-Interrelationships of Technology and Human Behavior"
Treatment I: Technology and the Self As Tzu-gung was traveling through the regions north of the river Han, he saw an old man working in his vegetable garden. He had dug an irrigation ditch. The old man descended into a well, fetched up a vessel of water in his arms and poured it out into the ditch. While his efforts were tremendous, the results appeared to be very meager.
Tzu-gung said, "There is a way whereby you can irrigate a hundred ditches in one day, and whereby you can do much with little effort. Would you not like to hear of it?" Then the gardener stood up, looked at him and said, "And what would that be?" Tsu-gung replied, "You take a wooden lever, weighted at the back and light in front. In this way you can bring up water so quickly that it just gushes out. This is called a draw-well."
Then anger rose in the old man's face, and he said, "I have heard my teacher say that whoever uses machines does all his work like a machine. He who does his work like a machine grows a heart like a machine, and he who carries the heart of a machine in his breast loses his simplicity. He who has lost his simplicity becomes untrue in the strivings of his soul. Uncertainty in the strivings of the soul is something which does not agree with honest sense. It is not that I do not know of such things; I am ashamed to use them."
Treatment G: Technology and Social Change
The written word made it possible to supplement oral forms of communication by recording thoughts and by examining, debating, and revising these thoughts. Over many years, the development of recorded knowledge stimulated the emergence of a technological world. However, a number of unanticipated consequences occurred as well.
First, the written word often narrows what we value as knowledge, and hence what we experience. It also creates a separation between knowledge and knower that may result in increased specialization, fragmentation, and social isolation.
Second, writing played an integral part in unleashing the scientific revolution, industrialization, and modernity. While this has led to longer life expectancies, improved public health, and greater economic well being for many, a large portion of the world's population does not enjoy these benefits. Economic philosophies and institutions have improved the lives of many but have yet to solve the problem of widespread poverty and illiteracy. Third, even in today's world, some societies are preliterate. These societies have little impact on the world, and are likely to be die out under the pressure of technological civilization. The reduction of cultural diversity may be an inevitable result of current trends.
While few individuals would be willing to forego the tremendous improvements in human well being resulting from written communication, making these benefits universal continues to be an issue. The central question is whether technology can be directed toward human ends or whether technological effects are essentially uncontrollable. And, if humans are capable of bending technology toward common purposes, how can this be achieved?
Treatment P: Technology and Work
Bill Lavery, a foreman of a paint-finishing department in an automotive plant, feels he spends too much time on technical matters and too little time on personnel issues. The tools and equipment used by his work group and the flow of materials through the department direct his primary attention to the maintenance and care of machinery. He also has to stay continually in touch with information generated by real time computer-based information on material usage, quality, and labor productivity.
Bill appreciates the economic benefits of the company's strong commitment to technology. Not only does the technology allow for impressive economies of scale, it is also necessary for his department to keep up with the fast pace of production elsewhere in the plant. At the same time, Bill thinks that he should spend more time instructing, coaching, and supervising his employees. He believes that the department will be more productive over the long term if he spends more time developing the members of his work group.
Bill has attended supervisory training sessions and he has talked with other supervisors about how they handle similar conflicts. No one has presented an answer that has helped him accomplish both the technical and the personnel tasks. He has resolved to devote at least an hour each day to direct supervision and support for his work group. He is concerned, however, that this plan is not realistic and that it might simply increase his personal work stress.
Appendix A2 Treatments Utilized for Testing the Effect of Knowledge Representations on Decision Outcomes: "Theme II-Group Cohesion and Violation of Authenticity"
Treatment I: Reactions to Communications on the Net
A quadriplegic woman types on a computer keyboard with her headstick, conversing with persons at other keyboards in the vast elsewhere of the computer virtual world. She offers her many women friends advice for their emotional problems that helps them effect real and positive change in their lives.
A few years later, it becomes known that the disabled woman is an imagined person, a perceived entity created by a middle-aged, physically-able, male psychiatrist. Feeling emotionally manipulated by this revelation, some women renounce the gains they made in their lives. Others feel the gains are justified regardless of the misrepresentation and they want him to continue "her" role. They argue that "reality" is totally subjective and the world is nothing more than the sum of our perceptions.
Treatment G: Member Relationships and Group Cohesion
Every cohesive group develops its own system of cultural symbols, widely accepted by its members and around which the emotional life of the group is organized. Insofar as the members act toward each other, they take the other's perspectives toward their own actions and interpret and assess activity in communal terms. Internalized understandings arise in this way to guide individual behavior in the group.
On occasion, a lack of authenticity by a key member is revealed in relation to the internalized understandings of the group. When this occurs, the symbolic and emotional system of the group breaks down, individuals reject the former positive experiences of the group, and the group quickly fragments into mutually suspicious and hostile factions.
Treatment P: Leadership and Corporate Morale
Young staff members in the finance department of a Fortune 1000 firm were unusually pleased with Jim Greenley, head of their department. They felt that they had received opportunities for significant learning and development due directly to the support and encouragement of Jim Greenley.
One day the office of the CEO issued a terse announcement that Jim would be leaving the firm, effective immediately. Information gradually emerged that Jim had been implicated in embezzling funds from the company. The younger staff members of the department were shocked, demoralized and felt deceived by Jim. The resulting discord within the finance department indicated to the company the importance of credible and trustworthy leadership.
